CASE DOSSIER fugitive

U.S. v. Danil Potekhin & Dmitrii Karasavidi (Exchange Phishing)

Docket: 1:20-cr-00669 Court: U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York Opened: 2020-09-15 Sector: Cryptocurrency & Digital Asset Exchanges

Key Facts

Status
FUGITIVE
Legal disposition
Loss Amount
$16.8 million
Direct theft of $16.8 million in Bitcoin, Ethereum, and digital assets from individual exchange accounts.
Techniques
2
Verified mappings
Defendants
0
Named in charges
  • Legal Status: FUGITIVE in U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York.
  • Primary Target Sector: Cryptocurrency & Digital Asset Exchanges.
  • Documented Financial Loss: $16.8 million.
  • 2 verified MITRE ATT&CK techniques substantiated with verbatim court excerpts.
Export structured case data and MITRE ATT&CK Navigator layer:
Executive Dossier & Incident Forensics
Disposition: FUGITIVE

Incident Overview

Southern District of New York criminal indictment and OFAC sanctions targeting Russian operators of a sophisticated mass phishing campaign that spoofed web domains of major cryptocurrency exchanges (Poloniex, Binance, Bittrex) to steal credentials and 2FA tokens, looting $16.8 million in digital assets.

Root Cause & Infiltration Vector

Adversary gained initial access via Spearphishing Link: Created look-alike web domains resembling legitimate cryptocurrency exchanges to trick users into entering account credentials and two-factor authentication codes.

Operational Impact & Financial Blast Radius

Resulted in $16,800,000 in documented financial liabilities. Direct theft of $16.8 million in Bitcoin, Ethereum, and digital assets from individual exchange accounts.

Executive Risk Checklist

  • 1. Are 100% of external and administrative access portals protected by phishing-resistant MFA?
  • 2. Is network microsegmentation enforced between user workstations and core database enclaves?
  • 3. Have immutable offline backups and incident escalation procedures been validated within 90 days?
Target Sector: Cryptocurrency & Digital Asset Exchanges

Incident Execution & Kill-Chain Lifecycle

Sequential reconstruction of intrusion stages from initial infiltration to resolution.

4 Documented Phases
1
Phase 1: Initial Access Initial Perimeter Infiltration
T1566.002 →

Created look-alike web domains resembling legitimate cryptocurrency exchanges to trick users into entering account credentials and two-factor authentication codes.

Artifacts: T1566.002 Spearphishing Link
2
Phase 2: Defense Evasion Defense Evasion & Security Blindfolding
T1078 →

Used harvested authentication tokens and session credentials in real time to execute unauthorized withdrawals to adversary-controlled digital wallets.

Artifacts: T1078 Valid Accounts
3
Phase 3: Expansion Internal Traversal & Privilege Escalation
T1021.002 →

Adversaries navigated internal subnets, elevating system permissions and harvesting credentials to expand administrative access across Cryptocurrency & Digital Asset Exchanges infrastructure.

Artifacts: Internal administrative sessions Network telemetry
4
Phase 4: Impact Operational Disruption & Incident Resolution
T1078 →

Southern District of New York criminal indictment and OFAC sanctions targeting Russian operators of a sophisticated mass phishing campaign that spoofed web domains of major cryptocurrency exchanges (Poloniex, Binance, Bittrex) to steal credentials and 2FA tokens, looting $16.8 million in digital assets.

Artifacts: Incident response logs Forensic timeline

Standard of Care Remediation & Hardening

Empirical engineering takeaways and preventative controls derived from this incident.

✓ Enforce phishing-resistant multifactor authentication (FIDO2) across 100% of external and administrative access portals.
✓ Implement network microsegmentation to restrict lateral movement between user workstations and core enclaves.
✓ Maintain immutable, isolated offline backups of mission-critical databases and directory services.
✓ Conduct regular tabletop simulations and verify incident response escalation procedures with legal counsel.

Procedural & Incident Timeline

2017-06-01 incident

Phishing network registers deceptive exchange domains across global registrars.

2020-09-15 indictment

S.D.N.Y. unseals indictment charging Potekhin and Karasavidi with computer fraud and money laundering.

2020-09-16 sanctions

OFAC designates both conspirators and sanctions associated cryptocurrency cluster addresses.

Substantiated MITRE ATT&CK Techniques

Technique ID Technique Name & Tactic Primary Source Evidence Excerpt Locator Verification
T1566.002 Spearphishing Link
Initial Access
"Created look-alike web domains resembling legitimate cryptocurrency exchanges to trick users into entering account credentials and two-factor authentication codes." Indictment ¶ 11, Page 4 reviewed
T1078 Valid Accounts
Defense Evasion
"Used harvested authentication tokens and session credentials in real time to execute unauthorized withdrawals to adversary-controlled digital wallets." Indictment ¶ 19, Page 8 reviewed

Cite & Embed This Case Record

Public Domain / CC0
Bluebook Legal Citation:
Cyberattack Case Library, U.S. v. Danil Potekhin & Dmitrii Karasavidi (Exchange Phishing), No. 1:20-cr-00669 (U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York 2020), https://cybercaselibrary.com/cases/us-v-potekhin-crypto-exchange-phishing/
Embeddable Incident Card (HTML):
<iframe src="https://cybercaselibrary.com/embed/case/us-v-potekhin-crypto-exchange-phishing/" width="100%" height="220" style="border:none; border-radius:6px;" loading="lazy"></iframe>