CASE DOSSIER sentenced

U.S. v. Paras Jha, White & Norman (Mirai IoT Botnet)

Docket: 3:17-cr-00105 Court: U.S. District Court for the District of Alaska Opened: 2017-12-08 Sector: Telecommunications & DNS Infrastructure

Key Facts

Status
SENTENCED
Legal disposition
Loss Amount
$127,000
Court-ordered $127,000 restitution alongside broader operational disruption across Dyn DNS and Rutgers University.
Techniques
3
Verified mappings
Defendants
3
Named in charges
  • Legal Status: SENTENCED in U.S. District Court for the District of Alaska.
  • Primary Target Sector: Telecommunications & DNS Infrastructure.
  • Documented Financial Loss: $127,000.
  • 3 verified MITRE ATT&CK techniques substantiated with verbatim court excerpts.
Export structured case data and MITRE ATT&CK Navigator layer:
Executive Dossier & Incident Forensics
Disposition: SENTENCED

Incident Overview

District of Alaska prosecution of Paras Jha, Josiah White, and Dalton Norman, the creators of the Mirai Internet of Things (IoT) botnet. The defendants compromised hundreds of thousands of consumer routers, DVRs, and IP cameras using default Telnet credentials to launch massive distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks, including the October 2016 Dyn DNS outage that disrupted major U.S. websites.

Root Cause & Infiltration Vector

Hundreds of thousands of internet-facing consumer IoT devices (routers, DVRs, IP cameras) running default Telnet factory credentials.

Operational Impact & Financial Blast Radius

Weaponized over 300,000 compromised IoT endpoints into a botnet that disrupted Dyn DNS on October 21, 2016, taking major U.S. websites offline.

Executive Risk Checklist

  • 1. Are 100% of external and administrative access portals protected by phishing-resistant MFA?
  • 2. Is network microsegmentation enforced between user workstations and core database enclaves?
  • 3. Have immutable offline backups and incident escalation procedures been validated within 90 days?
Target Sector: Telecommunications & DNS Infrastructure

Incident Execution & Kill-Chain Lifecycle

Sequential reconstruction of intrusion stages from initial infiltration to resolution.

3 Documented Phases
1
Automated Scanning & Compromise Telnet Default Credential Brute-Force
T1110 →

Mirai continuously scanned IPv4 space for open Telnet ports and authenticated using a hardcoded table of 62 factory default credentials.

Artifacts: Port 23/2323 Telnet scan logs Hardcoded 62-pair credential table
2
Botnet Command & Control Centralized C2 Tasking
T1071.001 →

Infected embedded Linux devices maintained persistent connections to centralized C2 infrastructure awaiting attack instructions.

Artifacts: Mirai C2 protocol beacons Memory-resident MIPS/ARM payloads
3
Impact Volumetric Dyn DNS DDoS Flood
T1498 →

Launched massive SYN, UDP, and HTTP floods against Dyn DNS infrastructure and Rutgers University servers.

Artifacts: Dyn DNS outage telemetry Volumetric UDP/SYN flood captures

Standard of Care Remediation & Hardening

Empirical engineering takeaways and preventative controls derived from this incident.

✓ Disable Telnet and require unique per-device passwords on all embedded and IoT hardware prior to deployment.
✓ Implement BCP 38 egress filtering at ISP and enterprise borders to block spoofed DDoS flood traffic.
✓ Isolate IoT and operational devices onto segmented VLANs without direct internet exposure.

Procedural & Incident Timeline

2016-10-21 incident

Mirai botnet launches massive DDoS attack against Dyn DNS, disrupting major internet services.

2017-12-08 plea

Jha, White, and Norman plead guilty in D. Alaska to CFAA conspiracy charges.

2018-09-18 sentencing

Sentenced to 5 years probation, 2,500 hours of community service, and $127,000 restitution.

Named Defendants & Operatives

Defendant Nationality Status Prison Term Restitution Notes
Paras Jha United States sentenced Pending None Co-creator of the Mirai IoT botnet used in the 2016 Dyn DNS DDoS attack; pleaded guilty in D. Alaska and sentenced to probation and community service after cooperating with the FBI.
Josiah White United States sentenced Pending None Co-creator of the Mirai botnet who built scanning infrastructure and pleaded guilty in D. Alaska alongside Paras Jha and Dalton Norman.
Dalton Norman United States sentenced Pending None Co-conspirator in developing the Mirai IoT botnet and Clickfraud botnet infrastructure; pleaded guilty in D. Alaska.

Substantiated MITRE ATT&CK Techniques

Technique ID Technique Name & Tactic Primary Source Evidence Excerpt Locator Verification
T1110 Brute Force
Credential Access
"Mirai scanned the internet for exposed Telnet ports on consumer IoT devices and authenticated using a hardcoded dictionary of 62 factory default username-password pairs." D. Alaska Information 3:17-cr-00105 reviewed
T1498 Network Denial of Service
Impact
"Defendants weaponized over 300,000 infected IoT devices to flood victim DNS and hosting providers with volumetric network DDoS traffic." D. Alaska Plea Agreement (Dec 2017) reviewed
T1071.001 Web Protocols
Command and Control
"Compromised devices maintained persistent connections to centralized command-and-control servers to receive DDoS attack targets and timing." D. Alaska Factual Basis reviewed

Cite & Embed This Case Record

Public Domain / CC0
Bluebook Legal Citation:
Cyberattack Case Library, U.S. v. Paras Jha, White & Norman (Mirai IoT Botnet), No. 3:17-cr-00105 (U.S. District Court for the District of Alaska 2017), https://cybercaselibrary.com/cases/us-v-jha-mirai-botnet/
Embeddable Incident Card (HTML):
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