AA24-057A: Understanding and Mitigating Russian State-Sponsored Cyber Threats to U.S. Critical Infrastructure
Key Facts
- Official advisory designation: AA24-057A.
- Published on 2024-02-27 by CISA, FBI & NSA.
- Directly correlated with 4 primary case dossier(s) in this library.
- Provides joint government TTPs, MITRE ATT&CK indicators, and prioritized enterprise mitigations.
Referenced Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVEs)
Related Primary Court Cases & Incident Forensics
U.S. v. Andrienko et al. (Sandworm / GRU Unit 74455)
Six Russian Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) military officers charged with deploying the NotPetya wiper, Olympic Destroyer malware, KillDisk attacks against Ukrainian power grids, and cyberattacks targeting French elections.
U.S. v. Netyksho et al. (APT28 / GRU Unit 26165 DNC Hack)
Twelve Russian GRU military intelligence officers charged with hacking into the Democratic National Committee and Hillary Clinton presidential campaign servers, exfiltrating emails, and orchestrating strategic leaks via DCLeaks and Guccifer 2.0.
U.S. & International Action: Dmitry Badin (German Bundestag Hack)
Russian GRU military officer charged with the 2015 cyber intrusion into the German Federal Parliament (Bundestag), which compromised parliamentary IT infrastructure and exfiltrated thousands of emails from Chancellor Angela Merkel's office.
Ukraine Electrical Substation Cyber Warfare Blackout
First confirmed cyberattack to deliberately cause an electrical power grid blackout. Russian military GRU hackers infiltrated power distribution companies, hijacked SCADA human-machine interfaces (HMI), opened circuit breakers at 30 substations, and destroyed control systems with KillDisk.
ATT&CK Techniques Cited in Advisory Matters
"The conspirators deployed the NotPetya malware, designed to irreversibly encrypt and destroy victim computer records worldwide while masquerading as ransomware."
"Conspirators compromised the software update mechanism of M.E.Doc, an accounting software used extensively in Ukraine, to distribute the malicious NotPetya binary."
"NotPetya leveraged EternalBlue (MS17-010) over SMB and PsExec to rapidly propagate across internal network subnets without user intervention."
"The malware harvested passwords from computer memory using a bundled Mimikatz variant to impersonate network administrators."
"Spearphishing emails containing weaponized Microsoft Word documents executing malicious macros were sent to Ukrainian electrical substation operators."
"Olympic Destroyer hollowed out the legitimate svchost.exe process to inject malicious wiper threads while mimicking regular operating system background activity."