MITRE ATT&CK G1017
Aliases: BRONZE SILHOUETTE, Vanguard Panda, Insidious Taurus
Official Attribution Source: CISA, FBI, NSA Joint Cybersecurity Advisory

Key Facts

Jurisdiction
People's Republic of China
Geographic origin
Cases
1
Prosecution matters
Defendants
0
Indicted individuals
Sanctions
0
OFAC designations
  • Attributed Country: People's Republic of China.
  • ATT&CK Group Reference: G1017 (Volt Typhoon).
  • Linked to 1 primary court prosecution record(s) with $150.0 million documented loss.
  • Identified 0 individually charged operative(s) and 0 OFAC designation(s).

Primary ATT&CK Techniques Employed

ATT&CK Techniques Mapped to Volt Typhoon Technique frequencies extracted from verified indictments for Volt Typhoon. T1078 Valid Accounts 1 incidents T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application 1 incidents T1584 Compromise Infrastructure 1 incidents T1059.003 Windows Command Shell 1 incidents T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter 1 incidents T1090.003 Multi-hop Proxy 1 incidents T1016 System Network Configuration Discovery 1 incidents T1018 Remote System Discovery 1 incidents
Technique frequencies extracted from verified indictments for Volt Typhoon.
ATT&CK Techniques Mapped to Volt Typhoon
Technique Frequency
T1078 Valid Accounts 1 incidents
T1190 Exploit Public-Facing Application 1 incidents
T1584 Compromise Infrastructure 1 incidents
T1059.003 Windows Command Shell 1 incidents
T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter 1 incidents
T1090.003 Multi-hop Proxy 1 incidents
T1016 System Network Configuration Discovery 1 incidents
T1018 Remote System Discovery 1 incidents

Prosecution Cases Attributed to Volt Typhoon

State-sponsored cyber group sponsored by the People's Republic of China breached dozens of U.S. critical infrastructure operators in communications, energy, transportation, and water systems to establish disruptive persistent access.

Primary Attack Mechanism: Exploitation of zero-day vulnerabilities in edge networking appliances (Fortinet, Ivanti, Cisco, NETGEAR routers) combined with the KV-botnet of compromised small-office/home-office (SOHO) routers used as obfuscation proxies.
11 techniques mapped · Loss: $150.0 million View full case dossier →

Documented TTP Signature for Volt Typhoon

Test Controls in Stack Audit →